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Criminality in the Law of War 
1 International Criminal Law 233 (M. CherifBassiouni ed.) 1986) 
T here are two completely different aspects of the subject of criminality in the law of war insofar as prisoners of war are concerned-offenses 
committed before capture (pre-capture offenses or war crimes); and offenses 
committed after capture (post-capture offenses). Many of the rules applicable 
are similar or identical, but some are different. The two aspects of the problem 
are certainly worthy of separate treatment. They will be so treated and in the 
order mentioned. 
Pre-capture Offenses (War Crimes) 
Historical 
By offenses committed before capture we normally refer to violations of the 
law of war committed against the nationals, civilian or military, or the property, 
of the Capturing Power or of one of its allies. Despite a rather widespread 
misunderstanding on the subject, there was nothing new about the war crimes 
trials conducted after World War II except their numbers and the broad range 
of the offenses charged. One author has given considerable publicity to a case 
which occurred in 1474 in wpich an ad hoc international tribunal tried one Peter 
von Hagenbach for various crimes committed while he was in command of 
what might be termed a military occupation, although the war was yet to come. 
Hagenbach pleaded that he had only obeyed the orders of his master, the Duke 
of Burgundy. His defense was rejected, he was found guilty, and he was 
executed.! 
Mter the termination of hostilities in the American Civil War (1861-1865), 
a conflict which had most of the characteristics of an international war, the 
Federal authorities conducted a number of trials of individuals for offenses 
committed against Union prisoners of war during the course of the conflict.2 
During the pacification of the Philippines which followed the acquisition of 
those islands by the United States as a result of the Spanish-American War (1898), 
a number of American officers were tried by American Army courts-martial for 
violations of the law of war.3 (This is another area where there is a good deal 
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of misunderstanding. While these men were tried for violations of specific 
provisions of the American Anny's "Articles of War," the offenses for which 
they were tried were also violations of the law of war and their trials would have 
been denominated "war crimes trials" if they had been tried by an enemy, or 
an international court.) And at about this same period the British Anny not only 
tried some of its own personnel for violations of the law of war committed 
during the hostilities in the Boer War (1899-1902),4 but the Treaty of 
Vereeniging (1902) which ended that conflict specifically provided for British 
courts-martial for certain Boers who had allegedly committed acts "contrary to 
5 the usages of war." 
Mter the end of World War I a "Commission on the Responsibility of the 
Authors of the War and on the Enforcement of Penalties" created by the 
Versailles Peace Conference recommended criminal prosecution for all persons, 
without distinction of rank, "who have been guilty of offenses against the laws 
and customs of war or the laws of humanity.,,6 The Peace Conference 
implemented that recommendation with Articles 228-230 of the Treaty of 
Versaille/ by which Gennany recognized the right of the Allies to conduct trials 
for violations of the laws and customs of war and promised to hand over the 
individuals requested for trial by a requesting Ally. Public opinion prevented a 
weak Gennan government from complying with those provisions and 
agreement was reached for trials to be conducted by the Supreme Court of 
Leipzig. The results of the twelve trials which were conducted were so 
unsatisfactory to the fonner Allies that they dropped the matter.8 This episode 
convinced most students of the problem that the Versailles solution to the 
problem was not a viable one. (The so-called "war crimes trials" conducted by 
the Federal Republic of Gennany itself since the end of World War II do not 
disprove that conclusion. For the most part they have involved the trials of 
Gennans for offenses against Gennans, where no nationalism is involved; and 
when they were begun sufficient time had elapsed for a change of public attitude 
and a cooling of wartime patriotism.) 
Codification 
All that has been mentioned up to this point was in the realm of the customary 
law of war. In a 1906 Convention for the protection of the wounded and sick 
there was a provision by which the Parties agreed, if their laws were then 
insufficient, to seek from their legislatures 
"the necessary measures to repress, in time of war, individual acts of robbery or 
ill treatment of the sick and. wounded of the armies, as well as to punish, as 
usurpations of military insignia, the wrongful use of the flag and brassard of the 
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Red Cross by military persons or private individuals not protected by the present 
convention. ,,9 
This was, of course, a call for national legislation to provide for the 
punishment of certain specific war crimes. Little was done to implement this 
provision; but the 1929 version of this Convention went even further when the 
Parties agreed therein to seek from their legislatures 
"the necessary measures for the repression in time of war of any act contrary to 
the provisions of the present Convention.,,10 
(For some reason there was no comparable provision in the prisoner-of-war 
convention drafted at the same time by the same Diplomatic Conference.) 
The first real international codification in this area, if such it can be called, 
was the 1945 London Charter drafted and signed by France, Great Britain, the 
Soviet Union, and the United States, to which 19 other states subsequendy 
adhered.11 It was, of course the basis for the Nuremberg Trial. A number of the 
other war crimes trials in Germany which followed World War II were based 
on an adaptation of the London Charter by the four Powers governing occupied 
Germany, issued either joindy or severally.12 However, most of the several 
thousand war crimes trials which followed World War II, both in Europe and 
in the Pacific, were based on the customary law of war and were conducted by 
courts established by individual states.13 It was not until the drafting of the four 
1949 Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims that we find true 
codification in this area of international law. Those Conventions contained two 
articles which, with appropriate and understandable differences, were common 
to all ofthem.14 The articles contained in the 1949 Third (prisoners-of-War) 
Convention read as follows: 
Article 129 
The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to 
provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be 
committed, any of the grave breaches of the present Convention defined in the 
following Article. 
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons 
alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave 
breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its 
own courts. It may also, ifit prefers, and in accordance with the provisions of its 
own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another High Contracting 
Party concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has made out a prima fade 
case. 
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Each High Contracting Parties shall take measures necessary for the suppression 
of all acts contrary to the provisions of the present Convention other than the 
grave breaches defined in the following article. 
In all circumstances, the accused persons shall benefit by safeguards of proper 
trial and defense, which shall not be less favourable than those provided by Article 
105 and those following of the present Convention. 
Article 130 
Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving 
any of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by 
the Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological 
experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, 
compelling a prisoner of war to serve in the forces of a hostile Power, or wilfully 
depriving a prisoner of war of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in this 
Convention. 
If you analyze the provisions of these two articles you will find that the Parties 
to these Conventions have: 
a. specifically established a number of substantive penal offenses which they have 
characterized as "grave breaches" of the Conventions; 
b. agreed to universal jurisdiction (of Parties to the Conventions) over those 
offenses; 
c. indicated that trials for "grave breaches" of the Conventions will be conducted 
by national courts; 
d. agreed that they will either themselves try any accused found in their territory 
or will extradite that accused to any other Party concerned who makes out a prima 
Jacie case (aut dedere aut punire);15 and 
e. guaranteed .. fair trial for any person accused of having committed such a grave 
breach. 
The procedural rules relating to the trials and punishment of prisoners of war 
contained in the 1949 Third (prisoner-of-War) Convention, set forth in some 
detail below in the discussion of post-capture offenses, would be equally 
applicable with respect to pre-capture offenses. However, it is probably 
appropriate to mention here that although Article 85 of the 1949 Third Geneva 
Convention provides that prisoners of war prosecuted for pre-capture offenses 
"retain, even if convicted, the benefits of the present Convention," a number 
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of states have made reservations to that article, insisting upon the right to treat 
such individuals as common criminals after they have been finally convicted and 
hi! h h . 16 wet ey serve t elr sentences. 
In 1977 a Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions was signed which 
elaborated considerably on the provisions quoted above.17 Articles 11, 75(2), 
and 85 of this Protocol repeat many of the offenses listed in the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions. They also add to the list contained in the Conventions a number 
of offenses which cannot be considered as being established penal offenses; rather, 
they are offenses more closely related to the conduct of war. These offenses 
include such matters as making the civilian population the object of attack; or 
the launching of an attack against an installation known to contain dangerous 
forces, such as a nuclear generating plant; or attacking an undefended locality; 
or attacking an individual who is hOTS de combat; etc. 
Although the Diplomatic Conference which drafted this Protocol was unable 
to reach agreement on the question of the defense of "superior orders," it did 
agree on provisions making superiors responsible for the acts of a subordinate 
"if they knew, or had information which should have enabled them to conclude 
in the circumstances at the time, that he was conunitting or was going to conunit 
such a breach and if they did not take all feasible measures within their power to 
prevent or repress the breach." 
(Article 86(2» 
It also agreed on provisions making it the duty of a commander who is aware 
that persons under his control 
"are going to conunit or have conunitted a breach of the Conventions or of this 
Protocol, to initiate such steps as are necessary to prevent such violations of the 
Conventions or this Protocol, and, where appropriate, to initiate disciplinary or 
penal action against violators thereoE" (Article 87(3». 
Presumably, should the commander fail to comply with the foregoing ~rovisions 
of Article 87(3), he would be punishable under Article 86(2), above. 8 
Article 88 of the 1977 Protocol I is entided "Mutual assistance in criminal 
matters;" and Article 89 is entided "Co-operation." As is not unusual in this 
area, where politics determine policy, these articles express pious statements 
rather than positive rules: 
"The High Contracting Parties shall afford one another the greatest measure of 
assistance in connection with criminal proceedings in respect of grave breaches;" 
(Article 88(1». 
220 Levie on the Law of War 
". . . when circumstances pennit, the High Contracting Parties shall co-operate 
in the matter of extradition;" (Article 88(2». 
" ... The provisions of the preceding paragraphs shall not, however, affect the 
obligations arising from the provisions of any other treaty of a bilateral or 
multilateral nature which governs or will govern the whole or part of the subject 
of mutual assistance in criminal matters;" (Article 88(3». 
" ... the High Contracting Parties undertake to act, jointly or individually, in 
co-operation with the United Nations." (Article 89). 
On the other hand, Article 75 of the 1977 Protocol I, entitled "Fundamental 
guarantees," does affirmatively set forth the whole gamut of protections to which 
a person charged with an offense "related to the armed conflict" or "arising out 
of the hostilities" is to be afforded. Thus, he is entitled to be informed of the 
reason for his arrest. He is to be tried by "an impartial and regularly constituted 
court respecting the generally recognized principles of regular judicial 
procedure;" and those "generally recognized principles of regular judicial 
procedure" are enumerated at length. Suffice to say that if they are applied by 
a truly impartial court (if any court trying enemy military or civilian personnel 
in time of war can be such!), no accused could complain that he Fad not had a 
fair trial. 
Mercenaries 
There is one aspect of the 1977 Protocol I which requires special 
mention. Article 47 of that document defines the term "mercenary" and 
provides that 
A mercenary shall not have the right to be a combatant or a prisoner of war. 
The drafting of such a provision and its inclusion in the 1977 Protocol I was, 
of course, a matter within the discretion of the Diplomatic Conference. 
However, what is bothersome is that all attempts to provide in that article that 
if the individual alleged to be a mercenary was tried as an illegal combatant, he 
would be entitled to proper trial safeguards, to the "Fundamental guarantees" 
of Article 75 of the Protocol, 19 a privilege accorded to the members of liberation 
movements who fail to comply with certain provisions of the Protocol and thus 
become, in effect, illeF combatants. Numerous aspects of the trial of the 
mercenaries in Angola2 appear to warrant considerable pessimism with respect 
to the fairness of the trials that these individuals will receive. 
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Conclusion 
Apart from the weakness of the prOVlSlons calling for international 
cooperation in the prosecution of pre-capture offenses, including the extradition 
of persons charged with such offenses, the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 
1977 Protocol I establish a number of substantive offenses and provide for the 
trials of persons accused of having committed those offenses, at the same time 
granting them all of the safeguards necessary to assure a fair trial. Any problems 
which may arise in the future with respect to the trial and punishment of persons 
alleged to have committed war crimes will not be because of a lack of applicable 
law, substantive or procedural, but because such law is disregarded or because 
of the improper manner in which it is applied. 
Post-Capture Offenses 
Introduction 
There has never been any question but that a Detaining Power has the right 
to try enem~fersonnel in its hands for offenses committed during the period of 
internment. The problems which have arisen in this regard are usually 
concerned with the actions of the Detaining Power in making penal offenses 
out of acts committed by prisoners of war, when the same acts would not be 
penal offenses if committed by its own personnel; in trying enemy personnel 
before specially constituted "hanging" courts; in denying to enemy personnel 
the safeguards of trial accorded to its own personnel; and in adjudging sentences 
against enemy personnel in excess of the sentences which could be adjudged 
against its own personnel found guilty of committing the same acts. 
When the matter of a convention on prisoners of war was under review after 
World War I, the Xth International Conference of the Red Cross recommended 
that "An international code of disciplinary and penal sanctions applicable to 
prisoners of war should be included in this Convention.,,22 That 
recommendation suffered the not-unusual fate of attempts to expand the 
international criminal law field-it was not accepted by the subsequent 
conferences on the subject. However, over the course of the years the offenses 
committed during the period of detention for which prisoners of war may be 
punished, and the procedures by which they may be punished for those offenses, 
have become highly institutionalized and, if there is compliance with the 
provisions of the latest and currendy applicable set of rules in this regard, those 
contained in the 1949 Third (prisoner-of-War) Convention, there should be 
no valid cause for complaint either by the person convicted and punished, or 
by his Protecting Power, or by his Power of Origin. 
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Substantive Offenses 
The Convention has reached a very simple solution to the problem of the 
specific substantive offenses for which prisoners of war may be punished: 
1. Article 82(1) of the 1949 Third Convention makes them subject to the 
"laws, regulations and orders in force in the armed forces of the 
Detaining Power" and authorizes the Detaining Power to take 
appropriate action for violations of those laws, regulations and orders. 
2. Article 82(2) of that Convention provides that if any law, regulation or 
order of the Detaining Power makes an act committed by a prisoner of 
war punishable when that same act committed by a member of its own 
forces would not be punishable, the maximum allowable punishment 
is to be disciplinary, not penal, in nature. 
By this means the Convention has, with respect to penal matters, equated the 
prisoner of war to the member of the armed forces of the Detaining Power. It 
has, moreover, accepted the fact that there will necessarily be some special rules 
of conduct promulgated by the Detaining Power which will be uniquely 
applicable to prisoners of war-but it has placed severe limitations on the 
punishment which may be imposed for violations of those special rules of 
conduct. 
Procedural Rules 
General: a. A prisoner of war must be tried by the same court, either military 
or civilian, that would try a member of the armed forces of the Detaining Power 
for the particular offense charged (Article 84(1»; 
b. The trial court must be one which affords the prisoner-of-war accused 
"the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality as generally 
recognized" (Article 84(2»; 
c. Double jeopardy (non bis in idem) is specifically prohibited (Article 86); 
d. The penalty assessed against a prisoner of war may not exceed that provided 
for in respect of members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power (Article 
87(1». 
Disciplinary sanctions: a. This is a type of punishment for minor offenses 
which may be imposed administratively by the camp commander or his delegate 
(Article 96(2». There is probably an equivalent type of administrative 
punishment in the armed forces of most nations; 
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b. The accused must be advised of the charge and must be given an 
opportunity to defend himself (Article 96(4)); 
c. The allowable punishments are limited to a monetary fine, discontinuance 
of any privileges normally allowed by the Detaining Power above those granted 
by the Convention, fatigue duties not exceeding two hours daily, and a 
maximum of30 days confinement (Articles 89 and 90(2)); 
d. The punishment must not be inhuman, brutal or dangerous to the health 
(Article 89(3)); 
e. There are a number of provisions establishing norms for any confinement 
awarded as a disciplinary punishment (Articles 88, 97 and 98); 
£ It is here that violations of the offenses unique to prisoners of war 
mentioned above will be punished; for example, there are several provisions 
with respect to attempted escapes which, when unsuccessful, are punishable by 
disciplinary sanctions only (Articles 91-94, inclusive). 
Judicial proceedings: a. The offense for which a prisoner of war is to be 
tried must have been such in the law of the Detaining Power or in international 
law at the time of its commission (no ex postfado laws) (Article 99(1)). Logically, 
this provision should have been in the general provisions, with the prohibition 
against double jeopardy; 
b. Lists of the offenses punishable by the death sentence must be exchanged 
as soon as possible after the outbreak: of hostilities and additions to those lists. 
may not be thereafter made without the agreement of the two belligerents 
involved (Article 100); and when a death sentence is adjudged, it may not be 
executed until six months after notice of its imposition has been given to the 
Protecting Power (Article 101); 
c. Mental or physical coercion in order to extort a confession is specifically 
prohibited (Article 99(2)); 
d. The Protecting Power must be notified of an impending trial three weeks 
in advance (Article 104(1)) and must, except in rare cases involving state security, 
be permitted to attend the trial (Article 105(5)); proof of the notification is 
jurisdictional (Article 104(4)); 
e. The accused is entitled to particulars of the charge and other documents 
in a language which he understands; to be represented by counsel of his own 
choice, or one provided by the Protecting Power, or one provided by the 
Detaining Power; to confer with counsel freely and privately; to confer with 
and to call witnesses; to have the services of an interpreter (Article 105); and to 
have a full opportunity to present his defense (Article 99(3)); 
£ The punishment which may be imposed upon conviction is limited to that 
which could be imposed upon a member of the armed forces of the Detaining 
Power convicted of the same offense (Article 87(1)); 
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g. The accused is entitled to the same rights of appeal as a member of the 
armed forces of the Detaining Power (Article 106); 
, h. There are a number of provisions establishing norms for any confinement 
adjudged by the court (Articles 88 and 108).23 
Conclusion 
Under the able guidance of the International Committee of the Red Cross, 
in the course of drafting the 1949 Third Convention the 1949 Diplomatic 
Conference modernized the provisions of the 1929 Geneva Prisoner-of-War 
Convention with respect to the trial and punishment of prisoners of war for 
offenses committed while in that status. Although there has, fortunately, been 
no occasion to test the application of these provisions on a wide scale they do 
appear to ensure fair and just treatment for prisoners of war accused of 
post-capture offenses. Once again, it may be stated that any problems which 
may arise will not be because of a lack of applicable law, substantive or 
procedural, but because such law is disregarded or because of the improper 
manner in which it is applied. 
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Addendum 
Mter the end of W orId War II in 1945 the victorious Allied Powers 
established International Military Tribunals for the trials of the major German 
and Japanese war criminals, as well as many other tribunals and military 
commissions for the trials of other persons who were deemed guilty of having 
violated the law of war. Hundreds of such trials were conducted. (probably the 
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last of those trials were those of Klaus Barbie, decided on 4 July 1987, and of 
Paul Touvier, decided on 20 Apri11994, both by French Cours d'Assises. In 
October 1997 proceedings were instituted in a Bordeaux court charging Maurice 
Papon, once a member of post-war French cabinets, with responsiblity for the 
deaths of1,090 FrenchJews during World War II.) 
Despite the many international wars which have taken place since 1945 and 
the many violations of the law of war which have been committed during the 
course of those conflicts, there has not been a single war crimes trial arising out 
of violations of the law of war which had occurred during those conflicts. (The 
United States tried William Calley and others for violations of the law of war at 
My Lai, in Vietnam, but at the time these were not considered to be true war 
crimes trials because the United States was trying its own personnel. Why this 
should make a difference is difficult to understand.) 
For subsequent developments in this area, see The Statute of the International 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: A Comparison with the Past and a Look at the 
Future (page xx hereof) and War Crimes in the Persian Gulf in the present 
collection. In August 1996 the Congress enacted, and on 21 August 1996 the 
President approved, the War Crimes Act of 1996} an amendment to Title 18 of 
the United States Code, which reads as follows: 
Chapter 118-WAR CRIMES 
§2401. War crimes 
(a) OFFENSE. Whoever, whether inside or outside the United States, 
conunits a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions, in any of the circumstances 
described in subsection (b), shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for life or 
any term of years, or both, and if death results to the victim, shall also be subject 
to the penalty of death. 
(b) CIRCUMSTANCES. The circumstances referred to in subsection (a) are 
that the person conunitting such breach or the victim of such breach is a member 
of the Armed Forces of the United States or a national of the United States (as 
defined in section 101 of the lnunigration and Nationality Act). 
(c) DEFINITIONS. As used in this section, the term 'grave breach of the 
Geneva Conventions' means conduct defined as a grave breach in any of the 
international conventions relating to the laws of warfare signed at Geneva 12 
August 1949 or any protocol to any such convention, to which the United States 
is a party. 
Under this statute the Calley Case would now be considered to be a war crimes 
case. 
